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Abstract: The evidence from several euro-area countries demonstrates the existence of a 
forecast bias in the budgetary process, which negatively affects fiscal performance. To 
remedy this bias, we suggest that forecasting should be assigned to an authority 
independent from the ministry of finance and the government, with the task of producing 
unbiased projections of growth and other variables crucial for the budgetary process. The 
ministry of finance should then be obliged to adopt these forecasts in the preparation of 
the official budget, thereby revealing ex ante its true preference concerning the size of 
the budget balance. The usefulness of our proposal is corroborated by the experience of a 
small number of EU Member States which already apply similar arrangements. 
The forecasting authority should be designed in such a way as to give it strong incentives 
to produce unbiased forecasts. This could most easily be accomplished by giving it a 
high degree of independence, similar to that of the national central banks in the ECB-
system and of the central banks in countries such as New Zealand, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. The forecasting authority – like a modern central bank – should be 
protected by legislation from domestic political pressure. We also set our 
recommendation in a wider context by comparing it to recent proposals for fiscal policy 
reform in the EU. Regardless of what other option for fiscal reform is pursued, our 
proposal would serve as a constructive complement.  
JEL classification: E6, F02 and H60. 
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How should the fiscal policy process of the Member States of the EU be designed? This 
question is presently the subject of lively discussion among policy-makers and 
economists alike. The debate has been fuelled by the recent controversy concerning the 
budgetary positions of Germany and France, which culminated in the ECOFIN decision 
of November 25, 2003. It has set off a flood of comments and proposals for re-
interpreting, revising or modifying the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the legal 
framework for fiscal policy-making within the EU.
2  
However, the debate goes back much further in time. Ever since the decision to create a 
European monetary union, economists have debated the proper role and framework for 
fiscal policy-making within a monetary union where monetary policy is centralized in 
one institution while fiscal policy-making is decentralized to the governments of the 
Member States (though remaining subject to a common legal framework concerning 
criteria for domestic debt and deficits). This is a historically unique situation. Never 
before has a group of independent nation states handed over their monetary sovereignty 
to a central monetary authority, while maintaining fiscal sovereignty – that is the right to 
tax and spend – within the nation-state.
3 In short, the fundamental question is: How and 
to what extent – if any – should fiscal policies be co-ordinated across the euro area?  
Many of the proposals for reform advanced by economists are inspired by the rule-bound 
strategy for monetary policy, which currently represents the mainstream stabilization 
policy paradigm. It is embedded in the design of the ECB-system and in that of other 
independent central banks. According to the prevailing consensus within the economics 
profession, central banks should have a high degree of independence from the political 
system and be assigned an explicit target for inflation. In this way, the incentives for 
short-run political manipulations of the economy are minimized, while monetary policy-
makers can focus on long-run objectives concerning price stability.  
This policy framework is commonly regarded as successful where it is presently applied, 
such as Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, and in the euro area. In short, 
monetary policy has been taken out of the political sphere – it has been depoliticized – 
and given to independent experts and bureaucrats to administer. 
To what extent could this approach be carried over to fiscal policy-making? Can and 
should fiscal policy be made as rules-based as monetary policy at the expense of fiscal 
discretion? Several recommendations in this direction have recently been put forward. 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited from comments by Michael Artis, Robert Boije, Elena Flores, Heikki Oksanen 
and Jan Schmidt. Editorial help by Sophie Bland is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors. 
They do not represent the views of DG ECFIN. 
2 See for example Fatás et al. (2003) and Gros et al. (2004). 
3 On this point see Jonung (2002). 4 
Most are based on institutional reforms concerning the establishment of a new fiscal 
authority that is more or less independent of the elected government and the parliament.
4 
The power proposed for the new fiscal authority ranges from that of being an advisory 
council to a full-fledged fiscal policy-making body. The most far-reaching 
recommendation is to take the task of short-run stabilization of the domestic economy 
from the ministry of finance/the government and delegate it to a fiscal authority or a 
fiscal policy committee, which would be designed to be as independent from day-to-day 
politics as central banks are at present.
5 
Despite the apparent weaknesses of the current fiscal framework in the EU and the 
increasing number of mostly academic voices proposing a more or less complete retreat 
of politics from the field of fiscal policy, the time is probably not yet ripe for a full move 
towards an independent fiscal authority. Political resistance is likely to be high.  
The purpose of this paper is to present a proposal for improving the fiscal policy process 
in the EU. We believe that our proposal strikes a compromise between the need for less 
politics in fiscal policy on the one hand and political feasibility on the other. Our aim is 
to reduce and even eliminate the forecast bias found in official budgetary projections of 
some large euro-area countries.  
The use of biased official growth forecasts partly explains the dismal performance of 
fiscal consolidation that has been observed in recent years in the EU. Specifically, 
budgetary plans are recurrently built upon overoptimistic projections of macroeconomic 
variables to make the budget balance look better ex ante, and then, ex post, blaming the 
worse-than-expected outcome on bad luck or other circumstances. In this way, the bias 
concerning economic growth translates into a more expansionary fiscal policy than one 
based on unbiased estimates, and in turn into a faster accumulation of debt. 
Our proposal to eliminate the forecast bias (more precisely the optimism bias) is to 
depoliticize the production of the economic forecasts underpinning budgetary plans by 
assigning the task of forecasting to an independent authority. This is clearly less far-
reaching than the more radical reform recommendations that have recently been made, 
yet superior in terms of its political feasibility. It can be justified on the grounds that 
producing economic forecast is not the ‘core business’ of governments and, since it 
requires technical expertise, it may easily be left to non-political experts. This is 
confirmed by the fact that a number of EU Member States already use economic 
forecasts produced by independent authorities for budgetary policy framing.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the forecast biases in the 
present fiscal policy-making process. This represents the positive analysis that underlies 
the normative policy recommendations that follow in section 3. Next, in section 4, we set 
our recommendation in a wider context, comparing it to recent proposals for fiscal policy 
reform in the EU. Section 5 summarizes.  
                                                 
4 For a recent survey see for example Calmfors (2003). 
5 See for example Fatás et al (2003), who propose a sustainability council, and Wren-Lewis (2002) who 
argues in favour of a fiscal regulator. 5 
2.  FORECAST BIASES IN THE PRESENT FISCAL POLICY MAKING PROCESS 
The strategic role of economic forecasts in budgetary policy is a recurring theme in the 
fiscal policy literature. Analysing budgetary plans versus outcomes in the USA over the 
1980s and 1990s, Auerbach (1994) shows that from a purely empirical point of view 
economic forecast errors consistently account for the deterioration in fiscal position over 
a relatively long period of time. In a political economy context, Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) briefly make reference to the common practice of adopting over-optimistic 
projections of macroeconomic variables with a view to improving the budget balance ex 
ante and then, ex post, blaming the outcome on bad luck. Analysing the accuracy of 
fiscal forecasts produced by international organisations, Artis and Marcellino (2001) 
acknowledge the key role of economic projections for fiscal policy outcomes, pointing 
out that poor forecasts underpinning budgetary plans could severely compromise existing 
fiscal frameworks.  
In this section we turn to the experience in the EU, examining how economic forecasts 
underpinning budgetary plans in EU member countries affect their fiscal stance. We 
show that persistent optimism in projecting growth in the planning phase of the budget 
coupled with inertia in the execution of the budget translates into a significant deficit 
bias. This bias is not detected by the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance to GDP 
ratio (henceforth referred to as CAPB) generally used to gauge the fiscal stance. Our 
conclusions draw heavily on the analysis of Larch and Salto (2003). 
Larch and Salto (2003) clarify the link between forecast errors and the fiscal stance by 
examining the traditional reading of the CAPB, the single most important indicator used 
for gauging the behaviour of fiscal policy-makers. Conventionally, changes in the CAPB, 
as opposed to purely cyclical variation in the budget, are taken to signal deliberate or 
discretionary actions by fiscal authorities.
6 However, as demonstrated below both 
analytically and empirically, this interpretation is misleading.  
The accuracy of economic forecasts and the readiness to correct for forecast errors can 
have – and has had in the past – a significant impact on the fiscal stance on top of 
genuine discretionary policy measures. In particular, lower than officially projected 
economic growth rates coupled with no or little adjustment of non-cyclical expenditure 
in the execution of the budget lead to deterioration in the CAPB. Moreover, a systematic 
bias in the economic growth forecast generally translates into a deficit bias and, ceteris 
paribus, into a faster accumulation of debt.
7 
 
                                                 
6 Prominent examples are the IMF in its World Economic Outlook and the OECD in its Economic Outlook, 
where both institutions regularly comment on fiscal positions in structural terms, associating changes in 
the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit with discretionary policy interventions. Similarly, in its annual 
report on public finances in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and, more importantly, in 
assessing the stability programmes of the Member States under the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the European Commission gauges the discretionary effort of fiscal policy by changes in the 
CAPB. 
7 The CAPB is expressed in percent of potential GDP to show the medium-term orientation of fiscal 
policy. Hence, forecast errors of economic growth matter only to the extent that they affect potential 
output. However, since potential output is typically extracted from real GDP data, including short- and 
medium-term forecasts, it follows that any revision of real GDP will also affect the estimate of potential 
output and, in turn, the CAPB. 6 
2.1.  Forecast errors and the fiscal stance in theory 
In this section we examine the mechanics of the CAPB. Specifically, we demonstrate that 
the behavioural assumption underlying the traditional reading of the indicator - according 
to which fiscal authorities fully control the fiscal stance – may distort the assessment of 
fiscal policy, especially as regards the role of budgetary forecasts. 
Using a simple analytical framework in continuous time, the CAPB in period t can be 
written as a function of discretionary fiscal policy measures denoted as  t fp  and potential 
output 
P
t y , i.e.  










t t t y fp g y fp r y fp capb − =  
where 
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t r and 
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t g  are the non-cyclical revenue and non-cyclical primary expenditure 
ratios, respectively, both expressed in percentage of potential GDP. The change in the 

























































Noting that the two expressions in round brackets represent semi-elasticities, the notation 
can be simplified to give: 

































Equation (3) essentially makes clear that in addition to the effect of discretionary fiscal 
policy, captured by the first term, changes in the CAPB will also depend on how non-
cyclical revenues and primary expenditures are assumed to be linked to economic 
growth. In current practice, changes in the CAPB are taken to exclusively reflect 
discretionary fiscal policy, which can be true only if the CAPB is neutral with respect to 




r ε ε = . This is a very radical and thus not generally 
valid proposition. 
On the revenue side it is reasonable to assume that any variation in the underlying rate of 
growth will automatically translate into a corresponding variation in governments’ 
receipts as, under unchanged fiscal policy, tax bases should bear a stable relationship to 
the level of economic activity. If this is the case, the elasticity remains the same from an 
ex ante and an ex post point of view, i.e. in planning and execution. 
Turning to the expenditure side, things are less clear-cut. The existence of a stable 
relationship between non-cyclical expenditures and the level of underlying activity 
cannot be taken for granted, unlike for non-cyclical revenues. Admittedly, in the 
planning stage of the budget, the level of expenditures may generally be set in accord 
with projected revenues. However, any relationship between expenditure and economic 
activity that may hold ex ante will break down in the execution phase of the budget once 
inertia comes into play.  7 
Any form of inertia on the side of the fiscal authorities – be it due to institutional hurdles, 
political constraints or simply lags – in the event of higher or lower than expected growth 
uncouples expenditure from the level of economic activity. In other words, an over- or 
underestimation of economic growth coupled with inertia in the execution of the budget 
will result in a deterioration or improvement in the CAPB compared to planned 
outcomes, even if fiscal authorities do not take any policy measures.  
Taking into account the distinction between ex ante and ex post, that is planning and 
execution, and assuming that discretionary measures are implemented according to plans, 
equation (3) becomes  
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r t E E ε ε 1 1 − − = ), the last term on the right-hand side can be taken to be zero. 
However, from an ex post point of view, the observed change in the CAPB will not be 
invariant with respect to forecast errors whenever inertia comes into play, meaning that 



















Thus, changes in the CAPB will generally not reflect discretionary fiscal policy measures 
only. They also include what Larch and Salto (2003) call the effect of passive fiscal 
policy, i.e. inaction in the event of lower or higher-than-projected growth. In particular, 
on account of the inertia and complexity generally found in the fiscal policy-making 
processes, it is safe to assume that contemporaneous corrections for growth surprises will 
generally be limited.
8  
Splitting changes in the CAPB into passive fiscal and discretionary fiscal policy does not 
make any difference to the actual outcome of the CAPB itself. An improvement or 
deterioration of the CAPB is purely factual. However, there are clear lessons to be 
learned from the story of how the change in the CAPB came about. In a framework of 
fiscal consolidation, for instance, a deterioration of the CAPB generally prompts the 
conclusion that the fiscal authorities should refrain from increasing expenditures or 
reducing taxes, while it might actually be more appropriate to ask for greater prudence in 
setting up budgetary plans or to flag the absence of prompt reactions to counter the 
effects of lower-than-projected economic growth.  
The practical difficulty with passive fiscal policy is that its importance will generally 
depend on the degree of inertia prevailing in the budgetary process. Hence, to correctly 
extract the effect of passive policy from observed changes in the CAPB, we would have 
to know exactly if and how much the fiscal authorities react to unexpected variations in 
                                                 
8 The importance of inertia in economic policy-making has been extensively discussed. One starting point 
is the famous argument concerning “long and variable lags” in monetary policy by Milton Friedman 
(1959), later reviewed by Blinder and Solow (1972) with reference to fiscal policy. More recently, 
political economy type of explanations for inaction and delay has been surveyed by Drazen (2000). In 
close connection with the issue of budgetary procedures, Halleberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001) 
provide empirical evidence for fiscal policy inertia in the event of negative economic shocks. 8 
the economic outlook, while the reaction is likely to be different in each instance within 
and between countries.  
However, it may be assumed that the fiscal authorities do not adjust expenditure plans 
when faced with growth surprises. This assumption of complete inertia may seem fairly 
radical but it will generally represent a reasonably good approximation in view of the 
long lags with which economic growth is measured, coupled with the slowness of the 
political process to designing, approving and implementing correcting measures within 
the fiscal year.  
Assuming full inertia, any departure from projected GDP affects the CAPB by an amount 
equal to the primary non-cyclical expenditure-to-GDP ratio for each percentage point of 
lower-than-expected GDP. If the tax system is not proportional, we would have to add 
the effect coming from the revenue side of the budget, which would, however, be 
comparatively small.
9 
2.2.  Do forecast errors matter in practice? 
A straightforward way to test the practical bearing of forecast errors on the fiscal stance 
is to include them as a variable in regressions examining the empirical relevance of fiscal 
rules as in Bohn (1998), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002) or Gali and Perotti 
(2002). The idea underlying these regressions is that, in analogy to the well known 
Taylor rule for monetary policy, the behaviour of fiscal policy may be captured by a 
relatively simple equation involving a few key variables. If forecast errors were relevant 
in practice, they should turn out to be significant in explaining the CAPB. In our case, 
using budgetary data for the four largest EU economies (Germany, France, the United 




































, 3 1 2 1 β β β β  
where capb is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance, d government debt, b the 
actual budget balance, all in percent of GDP. The expression in round brackets measures 
the size of the error on the one-year-out forecast for potential output growth. A negative 
sign of the  2 β  coefficient would signal that, in line with our analysis, an overestimation 
of growth coupled with inertia affects the CAPB. 
Other than in Germany, the official macroeconomic scenario underpinning budgetary 
projections does not include an explicit forecast of potential output growth. However, 
                                                 
9 With full inertia on the expenditure side of the budget (i.e. the level of expenditure is taken to be fixed at 
the planned level), the effect of a growth surprise on the expenditure side is: 

















































− − = − . By contrast, the effect on the 

































− − − = − ε ,  where 
P y
r ε will generally be close or equal to zero. 9 
estimates were obtained from official forecasts for actual GDP using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter.
10 To ensure sufficiently robust estimates of potential output, our 
choice of countries was also dictated by the availability of official medium-term growth 
forecast. In Italy and the United Kingdom, the official macroeconomic forecast includes 
projections reaching beyond the year of the budget. In the case of France, the one-year-
out forecast for economic growth was extended using a time series model before 
extracting the HP filter. 
The results of our regression analysis presented in Table 1 support our assumption. The 
estimated values of the coefficient 2 β , capturing the effect of forecast errors, have a 
negative sign, implying that an optimistic prediction of potential growth affects the 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal position. Moreover, the coefficients of the other two 
explanatory variables, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the actual budget balance-to-GDP ratio, 
also have the expected sign. Due to the small number of observations (18 per country), 
test statistics are relatively poor when running the regression for each country 
individually. The estimated coefficients, especially those measuring the effect of 
prediction errors, are not uniformly significant across countries.
11 As expected, the 
estimation statistics improve considerably when the country data are pooled.  
As the problem of inertia in the fiscal policy process is largely due to the political 
difficulty of changing spending commitments, the regression exercise is repeated by 
replacing the cyclically-adjusted primary balance with non-cyclical primary expenditure, 
in order to check the robustness of our finding. The results are reported in Table 2. The 
specification of equation (5) is slightly modified to account for the high degree of auto-
correlation in the expenditure series. The lagged dependent variable is included in 
addition to the prediction error and the debt-to-GDP ratio. The role of the actual budget 
balance in explaining non-cyclical primary expenditure is not statistically significant and 
regressions containing these terms are not presented. As before, regression results are in 
line with what we expect, i.e. optimism regarding growth in the planning phase of the 
budget swells the non-cyclical expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The  2 β  coefficients estimated 
in the country-specific equations have a positive sign and are significantly different from 
zero, except for the United Kingdom. The role of forecast errors in explaining the CAPB 
is confirmed in the pooled regression.  
 
                                                 
10 One-step-ahead forecasts of potential output growth were derived from annual budget plans for each 
year of the 1987-2004 period by applying the HP filter to the real GDP series including the official 
forecast and accounting for the end-point problem. These forecasts were then compared with “actual” 
potential output growth, estimated via the HP filter from the complete historical real GDP series starting 
in 1960, plus the April 2004 Consensus Forecast for 2004. 
11 In the case of Italy the negative sign of  2 β  is obtained only after including a dummy for the first three 
years of the 1990s. At the time, the Italian government was forced to enact restrictive fiscal packages to 
counter the risk of insolvency in a period of general economic slowdown, the degree of which was 
generally underestimated in the planning phase of the budget. As a result, the budgetary effect of 
overestimating growth was masked by the strong fiscal consolidation. The risk of insolvency is 
highlighted by Corsetti and Roubini (1993) who carried out statistical tests providing strong evidence 
that Italy’s fiscal policy was not sustainable in the early 1990s. 10 
2.3.  Are forecasts biased? 
If official growth forecasts were unbiased, the effect of passive fiscal policy on the fiscal 
stance, as measured by changes in the CAPB, would have to be accepted as the price of 
uncertainty. It would not make sense to blame fiscal authorities for not perfectly 
anticipating the future. Passive fiscal policy could even have a positive impact by adding 
to the operation of automatic stabilizers. However, a completely different conclusion 
would be warranted if official growth projections turned out to suffer from some sort of 
structural optimism, systematically overrating the underlying growth of the economy. In 
that case, the excuse of uncertainty would no longer apply. Passive fiscal policy would 
give rise to a deficit bias.  
Following the by now conventional approach pioneered by Theil (1966), the accuracy of 
official forecasts is checked by regressing the prediction errors of potential output growth 
on a constant α  


















and testing the null hypothesis of unbiasedness 0 : 0 = α H .  
The estimation results reported in Table 3 show a clear tendency to overestimate the 
growth rate of actual and, as a result, also of potential output, notably in Italy and 
Germany. In the case of Italy, the average bias is around 0.6 percentage points per year. 
Similarly, the official German projections on average overrate the underlying speed of 
the economy by around half a percentage point each year. While the forecasts are slightly 
more accurate in the case of France, they also appear to embody some kind of structural 
optimism. 
Only the British Treasury seems to produce unbiased growth projections. The estimated 
average forecast error is smaller than one decimal point and is not significant at the 10% 
confidence level. This is all the more remarkable as the official forecast of the Treasury 
for the period t+1 is generally presented in March of year t, whereas in the case of Italy, 
Germany and France the official forecast is presented later in the year.  
Von Hagen et al. (2004) also find a varying degree of accuracy in official growth 
forecasts presented in the Stability and Convergence Programmes. In line with our 
results, they reveal a statistically significant optimism bias over the 1991-2002 period for 
Germany, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. In addition, on the basis of 
a qualitative analysis, von Hagen et al. (2004) conclude that countries with the most 
optimistic growth outlooks are also those with the largest slippages from budgetary 
targets. 
Forni and Momigliano (2004) corroborate the optimism bias. Analysing the behaviour of 
fiscal authorities in OECD countries, they identify a systematic misjudgement of cyclical 
conditions made when fiscal policies have been decided, thereby creating an expansive 
effect on the budget. 
To sum up, we have demonstrated that over-optimistic forecasts of growth do impact on 
fiscal policy outcomes and the interpretation of those outcomes. The forecast bias 
together with the benchmark assumption of full inertia discussed above gives a rough 
estimate of the average annual deficit bias ensuing from passive fiscal policy. In the case 11 
of Germany and Italy the bias is around 0.2-0.3% of GDP per year, as compared with 
‘only’ one decimal point in the case of France, making it more difficult to judge the fiscal 
stance in Germany and Italy from an ex ante point of view, i.e. prior to execution of the 
budget.
12  
More importantly, the bias has a measurable impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio in the 
medium term. For instance, over the past five years, since the beginning of EMU, the 
optimism bias has, ceteris paribus, added around one percentage point to the debt-to-
GDP ratio in Germany and Italy, and roughly half a percentage point to that of France. 
Going back in time, to the beginning of the 1990s, the cumulative effect rises to more 
than 2 percentage points in the case of Germany and Italy. 
3.  THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT FISCAL FORECASTS  
In this section we enter the realm of normative economics, as we move from the analysis 
of the fiscal forecasting process to consider the political economy of fiscal policy-making 
and possible remedies for the bias we have found.  
3.1.  Why is there a forecast bias?  
The calculations presented above demonstrate the existence of a systematic forecast bias 
concerning growth; more specifically the growth rate is consistently overstated. The 
question then arises: why does this systematic forecast error occur? The most likely 
explanation is found in political economy considerations. Our working hypothesis is that 
ministries of finance and governments have an incentive to paint a rosier picture of the 
future than warranted by the evidence. In this way they appear successful, they can 
downplay the need for tax increases or other unpopular measures like reductions in 
government spending, and they can fulfil election promises.  
More generally, the optimism bias is part of the game that governments play in many 
countries. This interpretation is supported by the political economy literature, which 
suggests that parties in power are prone to describe the economic future in a more 
optimistic manner than opposition parties judging for example from the comprehensive 
survey of models explaining electoral cycles or delay and inaction in economic policy by 
Drazen (2000). For instance, a government facing political constraints – because of 
powerful vested interests, the public goods nature of the effects of fiscal policy or ex ante 
uncertainty about the private benefits of reform policies – has an incentive to be overly 
optimistic on economic growth in the process of planning the budget in order to play 
down the need for fiscal consolidation. 
The propensity to be too optimistic, the optimism bias, is documented by various 
empirical studies of official forecasts. It holds for growth as well as for other variables 
such as the rate of inflation.
13 On the basis of an empirical analysis, von Hagen et al. 
(2004) conclude that the form of fiscal governance is an important factor explaining the 
bias in GDP growth forecasts. Countries with a fragmented government structure appear 
                                                 
12 Although derived in a totally different way, these estimates are very similar to those produced by Forni 
and Momigliano (2004). According to them, the misjudgement of cyclical conditions has an average 
yearly impact of 0.2 % of GDP on the budget in about 60 % of the OECD countries. 
13 See for example for Sweden, Hansson and Jonung (1981). 12 
to be particularly prone to base budget plans on overoptimistic growth assumptions and 
to exhibit a greater degree of inertia when faced with unexpected shocks. For the United 
States, Bretschneider et al. (1989) report how political goals distort official forecasts.  
3.2.  An independent forecasting authority 
How can the optimism bias be reduced or even eliminated? Essentially, there are two 
options. The first one is to improve the methods of forecasting within  the existing 
institutional framework. In the past, economists would most likely have suggested this 
solution, as they tended to ignore the political incentive structure in which official 
budgets are made. This approach rests on the view that policy-makers act as benevolent 
non-political planners aiming at maximizing social welfare. This view has met with 
increasing scepticism in recent decades. 
Today, the standard method for reform propagated by economists is to find better 
institutions than the existing ones, more precisely, to modify the institutional framework 
so as to diminish the problems created by the incentive structures facing politicians. This 
philosophy underlies recent reforms aimed at establishing more independent central 
banks. In this spirit we recommend that the task of producing forecasts of economic 
growth and other variables crucial for the budgetary process be assigned to an authority 
independent of the ministry of finance and the government.  
The authority’s forecast should be produced on a regular basis and given to the ministry 
of finance as well as being made known to the parliament, the media and the general 
public for scrutiny and debate. The ministry of finance should be obliged to adopt the 
forecasts obtained in the planning of the official budget. The use of any other numbers 
should be prohibited by the legislation pertaining to the budget.  
The incentive structure of the forecasting authority should be designed in such a way that 
the authority has strong incentives to produce unbiased forecasts. This could most easily 
be accomplished by giving it a high degree of independence similar to that of the national 
central banks in the ECB-system and of the central banks in countries such as New 
Zealand, Sweden and Great Britain. The head of the forecasting authority should be 
appointed solely on merits and not for political considerations. The terms of the 
appointment of the head of the forecasting authority could include a clause whereby 
major forecast errors or systematic forecast errors could have an immediate and negative 
impact on his or her salary. A similar idea was proposed by Walsh (1995) for heads of 
central banks. Other incentive-compatible schemes could also be applied.  
A major advantage of the proposed forecasting authority over current arrangements is 
that it will be easier to track its performance, as its forecasts are made public. After a 
couple of years it will be evident how well the short-run forecasts have turned out. 
Clearly, the assessment can not be made on a year-by-year basis as even unbiased 
forecasters will generally be off-target. The assessment period should be reasonably long, 
say 5 years, to make a meaningful judgement about the average forecast error.  
The forecasting authority should be obliged to comment in public on its forecasting 
performance on a regular basis – similar to the process of communication between 
independent central banks and the public and political bodies. This process of enforced 
feedback from forecast errors into the forecasting process will enable the authority to 
learn from its past forecast behaviour. In short, the forecasting authority will be made 
accountable for its forecasts. 13 
It will in fact be easier to monitor the record of the forecasting authority than the 
performance of central banks as the goals of monetary policy are expressed in less 
precisely defined terms than that of the forecasting authority. Central banks have more 
leeway in the interpretation of their performance. For example, they can argue that their 
goal is expressed in the medium term and concerns the behaviour of the rate of inflation 
within a targeted interval – which gives many degrees of freedom in interpreting their 
actions. In contrast, the forecasting authority can be tracked simply using the point 
estimates (the forecasts) it has published. 
Another advantage of an independent forecasting authority is that it will strengthen the 
working of a democratic society by making the budgetary process more transparent, thus 
raising the quality of public debate and ensuring the accountability of fiscal policy. In 
particular, the independent forecasting authority would significantly restrict the 
possibility of the fiscal authorities to systematically overestimate growth, and hence 
future revenues ex ante, and then to blame bad fiscal performance on other developments 
ex post. Fiscal authorities would essentially be obliged to reveal their true preference 
concerning the size of the budget balance. 
The establishment of an independent forecasting agency should be politically feasible as 
it would be easy to incorporate into the present institutional framework of EU Member 
States where other types of independent bodies such as central banks already exist.  
A basic challenge is to find ways of minimizing the influence of domestic political 
pressure upon the forecasting authority. One way would be to have an international 
organization in charge of the forecasting authority, appointing its management and its 
staff of experts and bureaucrats, financing its activities and monitoring its performance. 
Economists have suggested this approach in various cases as a way of isolating an 
organization from domestic politics, thus maintaining its independence and guaranteeing 
a high-quality performance. 
EU Member States could be asked to use the forecasts made by the Commission. These 
forecasts have proved to be unbiased in the past.
14 The quality of the Commission 
forecasts could be improved upon if the Commission were to form the centre of a pan-
European forecasting network comprising national forecasting authorities across EU 
Member States. 
On the other hand, this type of institutional framework may be viewed as a controversial 
step towards centralization of fiscal policy-making within the EU. However, this is an 
inaccurate interpretation. The discretionary powers to design fiscal policies would still be 
in the hands of domestic bodies. These bodies, however, would benefit from unbiased 
forecasts.  
To sum up, an independent forecasting authority will be associated with several 
advantages compared to the current system where the forecasting is done within the 
ministry of finance or by bodies influenced by political considerations. These advantages 
are briefly listed in Table 4. 
                                                 
14  See Keereman (1999). In addition, von Hagen et al. (2004) provide evidence suggesting that the 
Commission forecasts actually encompass projections presented in the Stability and Convergence 
programmes. 14 
3.3.  Would an independent forecasting authority make a difference within the 
EU? 
Finance Ministers of most EU Member States mostly rely on ‘in-house’ macroeconomic 
forecasts for their budgetary plans. There are, however, a few exceptions, notably the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, which have independent agencies making official 
growth projections. The legal basis for producing the forecast to be used for the budget 
varies considerably across the three countries ranging from a gentleman’s agreement in 
the case of Austria to a formal obligation in the case of Belgium. As regards their legal 
status, these agencies are all formally independent but receive most of their funds from 
the government.  
A rough and straightforward test for actual ‘independence’ is to check the accuracy of 
the agencies’ projections. The less they are subject to pressure from the principle, i.e. the 
less the government and the ministry of finance can or do not try to exploit the strategic 
lever of optimistic macro forecasts for budgetary purposes, the more likely “outside” 
projections would be to have no bias or to be less biased than ‘in-house’ projections. 
The results of the accuracy check, presented in Table 5, clearly confirm this view. The 
forecasts produced by all the agencies covered have no statistically significant bias. 
Thus, we have strong reasons to expect that the establishment of independent bodies for 
forecasting across EU Member States will improve forecasting for budgetary purposes.
15  
As mentioned, even an independent forecaster will make forecast errors. Hence, the 
impact of growth surprises coupled with inertia in the execution of the budget will not be 
eliminated on a year-by-year basis. However, to the extent that forecasts turn out to be 
unbiased in the medium and long term, the independent forecasting agency will 
definitely enhance overall fiscal performance.  
4.  COMPARISONS WITH OTHER PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL POLICY REFORM  
The decision by the ECOFIN Council of November 25, 2003, which effectively 
suspended the SGP procedures, is the most recent episode of a ‘slow death by a thousand 
cuts’. The debate about the SGP had escalated well before this event. A whole industry 
of ‘SGP-therapists’ has sprung up, producing reform proposals ranging from minor 
suggestions on how to improve the existing fiscal framework to recommendations for 
completely new institutional arrangements. We will briefly review some of these 
proposals in order to compare them with our recommendations.  
4.1.  Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: A brief overview 
In Table 6 we summarize in a schematic, non-exhaustive manner a number of recent 
reform proposals concerning fiscal policy-making in the EU. The proposals are arranged 
according to whether they advocate new institutions or new procedures, and whether they 
favour a domestic or an international approach. Thus we arrive at a four-field system. We 
are aware that the proposals concerning the SGP can be analysed in alternative ways (for 
                                                 
15 In a study of the characteristics of state government revenues in the United States, Bretschneider et al. 
(1989) demonstrate that “forecast accuracy can be increased by having independent executive and 
legislative forecast agencies that have cooperative working relationships”.  15 
example the proposals can be organized according to what is the prime goal of fiscal 
policy) but for our purpose Table 6 serves us well.  
The more radical proposals, mainly launched in the wake of the increasing stress within 
the SGP framework over the past two years, tend to cluster in the lower part of Table 6 
(quadrants III and IV). They build upon the creation of completely new independent 
fiscal policy institutions, inspired by the philosophy underlying independent central 
banks. Here we find proposals such as those of Wyplosz (2002), Calmfors (2003) and 
von Hagen (2003). Following the general notion of independent fiscal policy institutions 
advocated by Ball (1997) and Blinder (1997), the idea common to all of them is that 
implementation and enforcement of fiscal targets should be less partisan. Different points 
of view prevail as to whether the institution should operate on the domestic or the 
international level.  
A second group of proposals (quadrant II) advocates changes of rules or procedures 
within the existing set of international institutions. Casella (2001) argues that the 
Commission and the Council should determine only the overall size of the EU budget 
balance and issue deficit permits that Member States can buy and sell. Other authors 
highlight the difficulties which ensue from the attempt to ensure long-term sustainability 
of public finances by imposing annual deficit targets. The suggested alternative is to 
adopt fiscal rules that take account of medium- to long-term developments.  
The Debt Sustainability Pact by Pisani-Ferri (2002), the permanent balance by Buiter and 
Grafe (2003) and the variant of the Golden Rule suggested by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) are prominent examples. Eichengreen (2003) rejects the usefulness of numerical 
thresholds for the deficit or the debt arguing that the EU should focus on structural 
reforms through the use of an index of institutional reform.  
Another group of proposals (quadrant I) essentially advocates improvements in the 
national budgetary processes as a complement to the existing international fiscal 
framework in Europe. These less radical proposals were put forward for instance by von 
Hagen (2002) and by Mills and Quinet (2001) at a time when the stress on the SGP was 
relatively mild. 
Table 6 presents a veritable smörgåsbord of proposals, which begs the question: how is it 
possible that prominent economists hold such divergent views on the appropriate fiscal 
policy process in the EU? We suggest the following answer.  
First of all, there is presently no common agreement concerning the proper goals and 
instruments for fiscal policy, the likely effects of fiscal policies and the institutions for 
fiscal policy-making, as there was in the heyday of the Keynesian fiscal policy paradigm 
in the 1960s and 1970s. A number of the proposals focus on fiscal sustainability, others 
on economic stabilisation and some on economic growth. Thus, the economics 
profession is not united behind one single model for fiscal policy.  
Second, economists are facing a new scenario, namely that of designing fiscal policy for 
a monetary union where fiscal policy-making is decentralized to the members of the 
union whereas monetary policy is centralized in one common central bank. Framing 16 
stabilization policies in the euro area actually represent a unique challenge different from 
that arising in the case of any other monetary union in history.
16 
In sharp contrast to this picture of diversity in opinion about fiscal policy-making, there 
is currently considerable conformity of views concerning the model for monetary policy. 
No major monetary economist questions the idea of an independent central bank with the 
goal of price stability. As long as this consensus remains strong, the economics 
profession will not challenge the ECB-system – in a way similar to the present critique of 
the SGP.
17  
4.2.  Where does the independent forecasting authority fit in?  
Where does our proposal for an independent forecasting authority fit among the other 
policy recommendations in Table 6? In fact, it is not an alternative to the proposals in 
Table 6 but rather a complement to all of them. An independent forecasting institution 
would be an important building block of any proposal for whatever fiscal framework one 
may favour, on either a domestic or international level. The importance of high-quality 
forecasts derives from the very nature of the budgetary process. As confirmed by the 
empirical results presented in section 2, budgetary plans coupled with a high degree of 
inertia essentially set the course for the actual fiscal outcome. Consequently, regardless 
of the framework one wants to build for the budgetary process to ensure specific 
objectives, unbiased forecasts – presumably produced by an independent authority – will 
always represent an improvement either in terms of fiscal performance or at least in 
terms of the accountability of discretionary fiscal policy.  
The lack of bias in forecasts assumes additional importance for proposals, such as the 
Permanent Balance suggested by Buiter and Grafe (2003), where the focus is on 
medium-term developments rather than on annual targets. In those cases unbiased and 
possibly prudent medium-term projections of potential output will be crucial as the 
assessment of fiscal policy will abstract from developments during the calendar year. 
Any optimism will accumulate over the years and render corrections more difficult or 
painful. 
5.  SUMMARY 
Empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of a forecast bias in the budgetary process 
of several large euro-area countries. This forecast bias negatively affects the fiscal 
policy-making process. To remedy this bias in the present process of fiscal policy-
making, we suggest the establishment of an independent forecasting authority, i.e. 
independent of the ministry of finance and the government, with the sole task of 
producing forecasts of growth and of other variables crucial for the budgetary process. 
The importance and usefulness of our proposal is corroborated by the experience of a 
small number of Member States which already apply similar arrangements.  
                                                 
16 Fiscally independent countries have in the past formed monetary unions with a common currency, such 
as the Scandinavian union. See Jonung (2002). However, fiscal policy-making during peacetime 
conditions was not an issue prior to the Keynesian revolution. 
17 The importance of a common policy paradigm for the stability of the euro area is stressed in Jonung 
(2002). 17 
The forecasts of this authority should be produced on a regular basis and given to the 
ministry of finance as well as being made known to the parliament, the media and the 
general public for scrutiny and debate. The ministry of finance should be forced to use 
them in the preparation of the official budget. The use of any other numbers should be 
prohibited by the legislation pertaining to the budget process. Without the strategic use of 
economic forecasts, fiscal authorities would essentially be obliged to reveal their true 
preference concerning the size of the budget balance already in the planning phase. 
The incentive structure of the forecasting authority should be designed to foster the 
production of unbiased forecasts. This could most easily be accomplished by giving it a 
high degree of independence, similar to that of the national central banks in the ECB-
system and of the central banks in countries such as New Zealand, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. The head of the forecasting authority should be appointed solely on 
professional non-political merits. In short, the forecasting authority should be run by 
experts – protected by legislation from domestic political pressure. It should be open, 
transparent and accountable for its forecasts.  
Another way to reduce dependence on national politics would be to shift the task of 
economic forecasting to an international institution. The European Commission is a 
possible candidate as its macroeconomic forecasts so far have a good track record, 
especially compared to those of the Member States. 
We also set our recommendation for independent economic forecasts in a wider context, 
comparing it to recent proposals for fiscal policy reform in the EU. Here we demonstrate 
that regardless of which, if any, other options for reform are selected, our proposal would 
be a constructive complement. It also has the advantage of being a fairly straightforward 
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coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
Germany -2.59 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01) 0.15 (0.56)
France -1.23 (0.05) 0.02 (0.16) 0.78 (0.00) -0.48 (0.05)
Italy -0.63 (0.40) 0.21 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 2.44 (0.00)
United Kingdom -0.22 (0.82) 0.24 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00)
Note: No. of obs. 18
coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
-1.21 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.71 (0.00) -0.23 (0.03)
Germany -- - 2 . 3 7
France -- - 2 . 6 7
Italy 2.87 (0.00) -4.13
United Kingdom - - -2.16
Note: No. of obs. 72
Budget balance 
t-2
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coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
Germany 2.1 (0.00) 0.67 (0.00) -0.07 (0.06)
France 1.28 (0.03) 1.19 (0.00) -0.01 (0.62)
Italy 0.75 (0.24) 0.61 (0.00) -0.03 (0.09)
United Kingdom -0.73 (0.45) 0.72 (0.00) -0.21 (0.00)
Note: No. of obs. 18
coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
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Country-specific regressions
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Germany Finanzbericht 0.52* 0.71 0.61* 1.91





0.59* 0.66 0.76* 1.39
UK
Financial Statement and 
Budget Report
0.01 0.3 -0.04 1.29
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An independent forecasting authority improves upon the fiscal process by producing unbiased 
forecasts or at least less biased forecasts than presently is the case in many EU Member States. 
2) Improved transparency and democratic accountability
An independent forecasting authority will make the budgetary process more transparent and thus 
make the democratic process work better.
3) Low set-up costs
An independent forecasting authority can be set up quickly at fairly low cost. 
4) Improved international cooperation 
An independent forecasting authority will facilitate communication and exchange of ideas 
between national fiscal policy-making bodies and DG ECFIN, OECD, IMF and ECB.
5) Compatibility with institutional status quo
There are no major difficulties to incorporate the forecasting authority in the existing institutional 
framework. It will not require any major changes in the body of legislation, nor will it be difficult 
to incorporate it within the present institutional framework of EU Member States. 
6) Delegation of technical tasks
Producing forecasts is not the 'core business' of the Government. 
Perceived advantages of an independent forecasting authority
Table 4
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Index of Institutional Reforms:
Eichengreen (2003) 
Quality of Fiscal Policy:
Beetsma and Debrun (2003) 
Note: The table covers a small yet, in our view,  representative set of proposals for 
reforming the Stability and Growth Pact.
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